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Résumé: Les biens et services de dépollution sont actuellement le plus souvent livrés 
par une éco-industrie. Cette note reconsidère la taxe pigouvienne dans ce 
contexte. On montre qu'une taxe optimale sur les émissions polluantes se 
démarquera du coût social marginal de la pollution en fonction des pouvoirs 
de marché relatifs des pollueurs et des firmes environnementales.   
 
Abstract: Pollution abatement goods and services are now largely being delivered by a 
specialized "eco-industry.'' This note reconsiders Pigouvian taxes in this 
context. We show that the optimal emission tax must depart from the marginal 
social cost of pollution according to the polluters' and the environment firms' 
relative market power. 
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1. Introduction
In his classical analysis of market failure, Arthur Pigou (1920) showed that the negative
externalities caused by pollution would be internalized by the market if polluters paid a
tax equal to the marginal social cost of polluting emissions. This proposition, derived
under the assumption of perfect competition, was later amended by Buchanan (1969)
and Barnett (1980): when the polluting industry is imperfectly competitive, an emission
tax should be set lower than the marginal social cost of pollution, because it trades oﬀ
the desire to provide incentives for abatement and the necessity to prevent a greater
contraction of output. Several authors (see, for example, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas,
1995; Long and Soubeyran, 1999; Morgenstern, 1995; and Smith, 1992) have now explored,
qualified and refined the latter conclusion under more specific industry structures.
All these studies, however, (in fact, all environmental economics so far) postulate that
a polluting firm possesses its own internal abatement technology. But nowadays, abate-
ment goods and services are largely procured from specialized environment firms, and
this so-called “eco-industry” looks rather concentrated (see Barton, 1997; Davies, 2002;
the European Commission, 1999; Karliner, 1999; the OECD, 1996; and the World Trade
Organization, 1998). In a recent paper that first acknowledges this situation, David and
Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) amended Pigou’s basic framework and found that an optimal
emission tax should now be set higher than the marginal social cost of pollution. In-
tuitively, imperfect competition between environment firms results in abatement prices
larger than the marginal cost of abatement; emission taxes must then be raised in order
2
to make polluters reduce their emissions suﬃciently. This note examines whether and to
what extent a similar conclusion holds in the Buchanan-Barnett context. The upshot is
that the optimal emission tax needs in general to adjust to the polluters’ and the abate-
ment suppliers’ relative market power. It may happen, for instance, that the distortions
respectively present on the product and the abatement markets oﬀset each other to the
point that the optimal emission tax turns out to be the one prescribed initially by Pigou.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives and
discusses our results. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2. The model
First consider n identical firms competing à la Cournot. Each firm i produces a
quantity xi of a final good at a cost C(xi), where the latter function is twice diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing and convex. Consumers’ preferences for this final good are captured
by the inverse demand function p(X), X =
Pn
i=1 xi , p
0(X) < 0. Each firm also generates
polluting emissions according to an emission function e(xi, ai), where ai represents firm
i’s abatement eﬀort. We assume that e(xi, ai) = w(xi)− ai , w0(xi) > 0 and w00(xi) ≥ 0.1
Now, let the abatement goods and services be supplied by a Cournot oligopoly com-
prising m similar environment firms. Firm j’s cost of delivering an amount aj of such
1Our qualitative results remain valid without assuming an additively separable emission function. This
assumption greatly simplifies the upcoming computations, however. It has been used in several previous
works (Barnett, 1980; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995; Farzin and Kort, 2001; David and Sinclair-
Desgagné, 2005). It also fits end-of-pipe abatement activities, such as solid waste management, waste
water treatment, air pollution control, contaminated soil and groundwater remediation, which currently
draw (by far) the largest share of abatement expenses (European Commission, 1999).
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goods and services is given by G(aj), with G0 and G00 strictly positive. When the mar-
ket for abatement is characterized by the inverse demand function q(A), A =
Pm
j=1 aj,
q0(A) < 0, each environment firm oﬀers a quantity aj that maximizes the profit function
Πj(aj) = q(A)aj −G(aj) .
Satisfying simultaneously the (necessary and suﬃcient) first-order conditions
q(A) = G0(aj)− q0(A)aj , j = 1, ...,m (1)
then yields a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the eco-industry.
From now on, we shall focus on symmetric equilibria, so a representative polluter i’s
production and abatement are respectively given by x = X
n
and ai = An , and a represen-
tative environment firm j’s delivered quantity of abatement is aj = Am .
3. Optimal emission taxes
Suppose that each unit of pollution bears a positive social cost ν. A benevolent and
informed regulator may now want to impose a tax t on polluting emissions. Ignoring
redistribution and income transfer issues, this tax would maximize the social welfare
objective
W (t) =
Z Xt
0
p(z)dz − nC(xt)−mG(atj)− nve(xt, ati),
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where by symmetry xt = X
t
n
, ati =
At
n
, and atj =
At
m
. After we drop the superscript t
(remembering throughout that abatement and output levels depend on the tax t), the
necessary and suﬃcient first-order condition for an optimal emission tax is given by
W 0(t) = n[p(X)− C 0(x)]dx
dt
− nG0
³nai
m
´ dai
dt
− nυ
·
w0(x)
dx
dt
− dai
dt
¸
= 0. (2)
A representative polluter will react to this tax by maximizing the profit function
Πi(x, ai) = p(X)x− C(x)− q(A)ai − te(x, ai) .
This is achieved if the following first-order (necessary and suﬃcient) conditions hold:
p(X)− C 0(x) = −p0(X)x+ tw0(x), (3)
q(A) = −q0(A)ai + t. (4)
Standard comparative statics on equations (3) and (4) confirms that dx
dt
and dai
dt
are respec-
tively negative and positive, meaning that a larger tax on polluting emissions generates
less production of the final good and greater abatement eﬀorts.
Substituting (1), (3) and (4) into expression (2) now yields the general formula for the
Pigouvian tax rule:
t = υ +
X
n
p0(X)dx
dt
+
¡
A
m
− A
n
¢
q0(A)dai
dt
w0(x)dx
dt
− dai
dt
(5)
Note that the denominator on the right-hand side is negative.
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Were the eco-industry perfectly competitive, which amounts here to letting m→∞,
the regulator should set t = υ if n also tends to infinity (as Pigou (1920) first proposed)
or t < υ if n is finite (in agreement with Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980), but with
an additional downward adjustment due to the term −A
n
q0(A)dai
dt
which expresses the
polluting firms’ oligopsony in the abatement market).
Let now m < ∞, so the eco-industry is imperfectly competitive. By (1), the price
of abatement in this case is equal to the marginal cost G0
¡
A
m
¢
plus a markup A
m
q0(A).
This markup further dissuades polluters from investing in abatement. To counter this,
the regulator has to play tougher on polluting emissions.2 Indeed, when n is infinite
(so polluters are price-takers), formula (5) coincides with the one obtained by David
and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) and we have that t > v. With n also finite, however, the
regulator must deal with the exercise of market power by polluting firms in the final
good market, which lowers consumer surplus, together with the simultaneous presence of
an oligopsony and an oligopoly in the abatement market, which both hinder pollution
reduction. After some algebra, the numerator on the right-hand-side of (5) indicates that
> >
t = υ if and only if
µ
n−m
n
¶µ
q(A)
dai
dt
¶
LECO =
µ
−p(X)dx
dt
¶
LPROD (6)
< <
2In practice, environmental policy has to also cope with the possibility of exit from the polluting
sector and entry in the eco-industry, and take into account the redistribution of revenues from polluting
to environment firms. A careful treatment of these issues is obviously beyond the scope of this note.
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where LECO and LPROD are the Lerner indices associated with the eco-industry and
the final good market respectively.3 As the environment firms’ market power matters
relatively more (less), so n−m
n
or LECO
LPROD
increases (decreases), the regulator would now
impose a higher (lower) tax on emissions. This tax will approximate Pigou (1920)’s
recommendation when the upstream and downstream industry structures are such that
LPROD
LECO
≈ m− n
n
q(A)
p(X)
dai
dt
dx
dt
. (7)
4. Concluding remarks
This paper showed that taxes targetting polluting emissions must adjust to the relative
market power of environment firms (on the abatement market) and polluters (on both the
final good and the abatement markets). All things equal, a relatively more concentrated
and powerful eco-industry warrants higher emission taxes.
The impact of more complex and realistic industry structures - with endogenous entry
and exit, or privately informed and heterogeneous environment firms, for example - on
Pigouvian taxes and environmental regulation in general remains to be explored. Pursuing
this path, henceforth investigating the vertical relationships and actual division of labor
between polluting firms and their abatement suppliers, will certainly shed light on the
3Defined as the diﬀerence between the firm’s price and its marginal cost, divided by the firm’s price, the
Lerner index is a well-known measure of a firm’s market power. Here we have that LECO =
q(A)−G(aj)
q(A) =
1
m|η| and LPROD =
p(X)−C0(x)
p(X) =
1
n|ε| , where ε and η are the price-elasticities of demand for the final
good and for the abatement goods and services respectively.
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current black box of abatement costs, for the greater eﬀectiveness of environmental policy.
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